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Privity, Preclusion, and the Parent-Child 
Relationship 
Preclusion, a modern term encompassing the procedural 
principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, is a judicial 
mechanism that serves to prevent relitigation of a claim or issue 
once a final determination has been made in a court of competent 
jurisdiction.' Through the use of preclusion, courts may secure 
finality and consistency in judgments and eliminate harassing 
multiple litigation and spurious  claim^.^ Courts may invoke pre- 
clusion to prevent relitigation not only by parties to the first 
action, but by nonparties as well;3 courts have justified preclusion 
of nonparties in future litigation by reason of their privity rela- 
tionship with parties to the first a ~ t i o n . ~  
The doctrine of privity provides that a nonparty whose inter- 
ests are substantially identical to those of a party who has had 
his day in court is not deprived of justice by the denial of an 
opportunity to relitigate the same matters. While privity is osten- 
sibly based on any commonality of interests, common law courts 
have traditionally viewed the doctrine as applying to a fixed set 
1. The term "preclusion" is used throughout this Comment to indicate the concepts 
traditionally referred to as res judicata and collateral estoppel. The preclusion rubric is 
gaining wide acceptance among courts, commentators, and casebook authors as a more 
accurate and functional terminology. See, e.g., Towle v. Boeing Airplane Co., 364 F.2d 
590,592 (8th Cir. 1966); Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp. 35,65 (D. Minn. 1966); 
Moore v. Deal, 240 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 15 Cal. 
3d 942,544 P.2d 941,126 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1976); D. KARLEN, R. MEISENHOLDER, G. STEVENS, 
& A. VESTAL, CIVIL PROCEDURE (1975); J. MCCOID, CIVIL PROCEDURE (1974); Vestal, Extent 
of Claim Preclusion, 54 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1968). The Restatement (Second) of Judgments 
recognizes the modem preclusion terminology, but continues to use a mixture of old and 
new in its text. RJBTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS vii & §§ 68,88 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 
19%). 
Res judicata and collateral estoppel are essentially equivalent to claim preclusion and 
issue preclusion respectively. See notes 11-26 and accompanying text infra. The preclusion 
terminology facilitates a unified approach to the doctrine and obviates many artificial 
distinctions between res judicata and collateral estoppel that result from their disparate 
origins. See generally Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res 
Judicata, 35 ILL. L. REV. 41, 53-54 (1940). 
2. See Vestal, Rationale of Preclusion, 9 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 29, 29-35 (1964). 
3. General application of preclusion to nonparties is summarized in RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 9 $  81-88 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975). See generally Vestal, supra 
note 1, at 12-18; Vestal, PreclusionlRes Judicata Variables: Parties, 50 IOWA L. REV. 27, 
43-76 (1964). 
4. E.g., Falk v. Falk Corp., 390 F. Supp. 1276, 1283-84 (E.D. Wis. 1975), Gamble Co. 
v. Buyers Transp. Co., 355 F. Supp. 547, 557 (W.D. Mo. 1973). 
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of  relationship^.^ Familial relationships are conspicuously absent 
from the traditional privity lists. Consequently, rather than de- 
termining whether the merits of each case and the underlying 
policy factors warrant imposition of preclusion, most courts have 
summarily refused to invoke preclusion, holding that parents and 
children are not in p r i ~ i t y . ~  
Cases involving the parent-child relationship do not man- 
date such a rhadamanthine application of traditional privity 
rules. Rather, the unique nature of this relationship requires a 
rational judicial approach to the use of preclusion. This Comment 
will consider the policies underlying privity and preclusion and 
apply those policies to selected cases in which the courts have 
improperly invoked, or failed to invoke, preclusion. It will also 
evaluate possible solutions to the conflict between preclusion and 
substantive rights by examining those procedures and judicial 
controls by which the policies favoring preclusion may be fulfilled 
in parent-child cases without jeopardizing the rights of the per- 
sons involved. 
A. Preclusion in General 
The concept of continuity is fundamental to the Anglo- 
American legal system. The law is a continuum; interdependence 
of decisions forms the basis for a just application of its principles.' 
One aspect of this continuum is the doctrine of stare dec i~ is ;~  
another is law of the case? Preclusion is merely one additional 
facet of this overall interdependence. In applying preclusion, a 
court in essence invokes a more specific form of stare decisis-the 
principle by which former adjudication may influence subsequent 
cases. Preclusion requires stricter adherence to previously liti- 
gated claims or issues and may demand the same result reached 
in former cases. This demand may serve to preclude subsequent 
5. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 83 & Comment a (1942); Vestal, supra note 1, 
at 12-14. Exhaustive works on the preclusive effects of judgments invariably include lists 
of designated privy relationships. E.g., 1 A. FREEMAN, LAW OF JUDGMENTS §§ 438, 444-501 
(5th ed. 1925); 2 H. BLACK, LAW OF JUDGMENTS $9 549-598 (1891). 
6.  See Greenlee v. John G. Shedd Aquarium, 36 Ill. App. 3d 924, 344 N.E.2d 788 
(1976); Whitehead v. General Tel. Co., 20 Ohio St. 2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969). 
7. The principles of preclusion and their rationale are discussed in terms of the 
general continuum concept in A. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION 3-7 (1969). 
8. See M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 211 (1972); 2 H. BLACK, supra note 5, a t  
8 603. 
9. Vestal, Law of the Case: Single Suit Preclusion, 1967 UTAH L. REV. 1. 
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litigation altogether. 
The preclusion principles are not self-justifying. They exist 
only because they serve to protect interests that our society and 
legal system have recognized as indispensable to fundamental 
fairness and to efficient adjudication of disputes. Four distinct 
policies provide the foundation for all forms of preclusion: (1) to 
provide security to litigants by assuring finality, (2) to ensure 
consistency in judgments, (3) to avoid harassing multiple litiga- 
tion, and (4) to reduce the burden on the courts by elimination 
of spurious claims.1° Where the imposition of preclusion serves 
none of these policies, it is neither justified nor desirable. Con- 
versely, if denying the right to relitigate a claim or issue would 
serve one or more of the above policies, the courts should carefully 
weigh the factors favoring preclusion, rather than mechanically 
refuse to apply it by reason of traditional privity rules.ll These 
policies apply equally to both categories into which preclusion 
may be subdivided-claim preclusion and issue preclusion.12 
1. Claim preclusion 
Claim preclusion operates to prevent a party or privy to an 
initial action from relitigating in a second suit a claim on which 
a final judgment has been reached. Although many legal scholars 
have further subdivided this principle,13 one rule suffices to cover 
all cases: "One may not sue twice on the same cause of action 
where the first suit terminated in a final judgment on the mer- 
its."14 This simple definition includes all the requirements that 
must be satisfied to invoke claim preclusion: (1) same cause of 
action, (2) decision on the merits, and (3) finality of judgment. 
The first requirement, that the causes of action in the two 
suits be identical, has proved troublesome. Courts and commen- 
tators have failed to develop a sufficiently precise definition of 
"cause of action" that is workable in a majority of cases.15 Two 
10. The rationale of the policies favoring preclusive effect of claims and issues is 
discussed in A. VESTAL, supra note 7, a t  8-12. Professor Vestal refers to a policy of 
"establishing the rights of individuals." Providing security to litigants by assuring finality 
and consistent judgments is a policy implicit in this category. See id. at 8. 
11. Compare Armstrong v. Armstrong, 15 Cal. 3d 942, 544 P.2d 941, 126 Cal. Rptr. 
805 (1976) with Whitehead v. General Tel. Co., 20 Ohio St. 2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969). 
12. For an introduction to the concepts of claim and issue preclusion, see A. VESTAL, 
supra note 7 ,  at 43-59, 189-206 (1969). 
13. Commentators have traditionally split the concept of claim preclusion into "bar" 
and "merger" and treated the two separately. See M. GREEN, supra note 8, at 201-02 
(1972); J. FLEMING, CIVIL PROCEDURE $ 11.9, at 550 (1965). 
14. J. MCCOID, supra note 1, at 622. 
15. For a discussion of the basic problems surrounding the definition of "claim" or 
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theories concerning what constitutes a single claim or cause of 
action have evolved. The primary right theory narrowly defines 
a cause of action or claim as the infringement of a single right by 
a single wrong? The more practical theory, from the standpoint 
of judicial economy, is the factual test that requires a plaintiff to 
litigate in one action all issues arising from a single transaction 
or series of transactions. l7 
The second criterion for claim preclusion requires that the 
initial judgment be rendered on the merits; i.e., the judgment 
must be based on those factual conclusions which support the 
claim and not on unrelated matters. Thus, any judgment ob- 
tained by fraud or collusion is not an adjudication on the merits 
and therefore not a proper circumstance for the imposition of 
p rec lu~ ion .~~  Whether or not a judgment is considered to be on the 
merits for preclusion purposes may depend at  times on proce- 
dural rules such as those pertaining to multiple  dismissal^.^^ 
The third criterion requires that the first judgment be "final" 
before preclusion can be invoked in a second suit. Finality gener- 
ally connotes exhaustion of remedies with the particular judicial 
body pronouncing judgment. Finality does not necessarily indi- 
cate, however, that the original litigant's rights have been conclu- 
"cause of action" and their potential resolution, see Schopflocher, What is a Single Cause 
of Action for the Purpose of the Doctrine of Res Judicata?, 21 ORE. L. REV. 319,363 (1942). 
For more recent discussions, noting that problems of vagueness continue to plague the 
phrase "cause of action," see M. GREEN, supra note 8, a t  202-03; J. FLEMING, supra note 
13, 8 11.10, a t  552-57. 
16. The United States Supreme Court approved the primary right theory in Balti- 
more S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927): 
A cause of action does not consist of facts, but of the unlawful violation of 
a right which the facts show. The number and variety of the facts alleged do 
not establish more than one cause of action so long as their result, whether they 
be considered severally or in combination, is the violation of but one right by a 
single legal wrong. 
A more recent decision adhering to this concept of cause of action is Smith v. Kirckpa- 
trick, 305 N.Y. 66, 70, 11 N.E.2d 209, 212 (1953). While still an accepted theory, the 
application of the primary right formulation often results in excess fragmentation that 
may serve to cloud rather than clarify a party's ultimate rights. 
17. E.g., Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464, 469-70 (3d Cir. 
1950); Falcone v. Middlesex Co. Medical Soc'y, 47 N.J. 92, 219 A.2d 505 (1966); cf. Ashe 
v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448, 453-55 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring) (Harlan argues for 
a "same transaction" test in applying preclusion in criminal or quasi-criminal cases. This 
is basically the test now advocated in the Restatement, referred to as the "transactional 
view." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 8 61 & Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 1, 
1973) .) 
18. E.g., Town of Andes v. Ely, 158 U.S. 312 (1895); Grummons v. Zollinger, 240 F. 
Supp. 63, 75 (N.D. Ind. 1964), aff'd, 341 F.2d 464 (7th Cir. 1965). 
19. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 41; Vestal, Claim Preclusion by Rule, 2 IND. LEGAL 
F. 25 (1968). 
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sively determined. State courts are split on the issue of finality 
where an appeal is pending.20 A majority of jurisdictions, includ- 
ing the federal courts, consider judgments to be final pending 
appeal. The United States Supreme Court has twice ruled that 
cases are final pending appeal and allowed preclusion despite 
subsequent reversal .21 
2. Issue preclusion 
Issue preclusion is more pervasive in its effect than claim 
preclusion and may operate on entirely different causes of action. 
Issue preclusion may be invoked where the issues are (1) identical 
in both cases, (2) ultimate-i.e., necessary to the ultimate dispo- 
sition of both cases-and (3) actually litigated in the first case.22 
The requirement of identity of issues presents a problem sim- 
ilar to that of "same cause of action."23 Theoretically, identity of 
issues should be determined by comparing underlying factual 
conclusions. In the interest of judicial economy, however, the 
modern trend is to allow considerable latitude in the compari- 
In fact, the breadth that courts attach to the concept of an 
issue may be a function of a crowded docket.25 In other words, a 
judge may be more willing to find identity of issues and impose 
preclusion if the relitigation of the same or closely related facts 
would unduly burden an overcrowded schedule. 
Issue preclusion may be invoked only if the issue under con- 
sideration is an "ultimate" one. An ultimate issue is one that is 
necessary to the disposition of the cause of action. Logically, one 
20. See Makariw v. Rinard, 222 F. Supp. 336,338 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (applying Pennsyl- 
vania law): "[Tlhe rule of res judicata is that when a Court of competent jurisdiction 
has determined a litigated cause on its merits, the judgment entered, until reversed, is, 
forever and under all circumstances, final and conclusive. . . ." This principle is further 
clarified in a footnote to the opinion: "The fact that an appeal is pending in the prior civil 
action does not militate against its effect as a final judgment." Id. at  338 n.1. But see 
Mutual Orange Distrib. v. Agricultural Prorate Comm'n, 30 F. Supp. 937, 942 (S.D. Cal. 
1940) (applying California law). The court applied a California statute (CAL. CN. PROC. 
CODE 4 1049 (West 1959)) that it construed to deny preclusive effect of a judgment to 
which an appeal was pending. See also MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 53-8706 (1947). 
21. Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191 (1932); Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499 
(1903). The Restatement (Second) follows this view. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 
4 41 & Comments b & f (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). 
22. See Vestal, PreclusionlRes Judicata Variables: Nature of the Controversy, 1965 
WASH. U.L.Q. 158, 159-87. 
23. See notes 14-17 and accompanying text supra. 
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 4 68, Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 1, 
1973) (suggesting that a finding of negligence due to excessive speed may be equated for 
preclusion purposes with a finding of negligence for failure to keep a proper lookout). 
25. See Vestal, supra note 22, a t  162. 
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may not be bound by the determination of an issue if that issue 
was not relevant to the final judgment reached by the court. A 
notable opinion authored by Judge Learned Hand established the 
principle that ultimate issues decided in an initial suit cannot 
preclude redetermination of the same issues in a second suit if 
those issues are only mediate therein.26 Other decisions have held 
that determination of facts or issues mediate in an initial action 
cannot preclude their redetermination as ultimate facts in a sec- 
ond suit.27 The reasoning behind both principles is to prevent 
unintentional preclusion of an issue, the importance of which was 
not forseeable in the original action.28 
According to the Restatement of Judgments, an "actually 
litigated" issue is one put in issue by the pleadings, submitted to 
the trier of fact for a determination, and actually ruled on by the 
trier of fact.29 Thus, it would seem that to satisfy the third crite- 
rion for issue preclusion a litigant must have entered evidence on 
the issue and received a judicial determination based upon that  
evidence." Some courts, however, have held that issues are fully 
litigated once a final determination is reached whether the deci- 
sion is deemed to be on the merits or is merely the result of a 
procedural de te rmina t i~n .~~  As a general rule, the requirement of 
actual litigation for purposes of issue preclusion necessitates a 
true decision on the merits. 
B. Preclusion of Nonparties 
Anyone not a party to the original action may be precluded 
from litigating the same matters if he is found to be in privity 
with the original litigant. Preclusion of nonparties, however, is 
not limited to the traditional privity rules. Under differing cir- 
cumstances two other preclusive devices may be relevant to the 
parent-child relationship-derivative rights and adequate repre- 
~ e n t a t i o n . ~ ~  After an examination of each concept, the application 
26. The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944). " 'Ultimate' facts are those 
which the law makes the occasion for imposing its sanctions." Id. a t  928. See Moore v. 
United States, 246 F. Supp. 19 (N.D. Miss. 1965): "Evidentiary facts or mediate data . . . 
are those from which ultimate facts may be inferred." Id. at 21. 
27. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment p (1942). 
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment i (Tent. Draft No. 1, 
1973); Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HAW. L. REV. 818, 842-43 (1952). 
29. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS 9 68(2) & Comments c & d (1942). 
30. See, e.g., Eastern Foundation Co. v. Creswell, 475 F.2d 351, 355 (1973). 
31. See, e.g., Stuhl v. Tauro, 476 F.2d 233, 233 (1973). 
32. Vestal, supra note 1, a t  12-17. Professor Vestal concludes that the applicability 
of any of the principles by which a nonparty might be precluded is dependent more on 
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of these three preclusive tools to the parent-child relationship will 
be discussed. 
1 .  Traditional privity 
Privity, in its most general sense, has been defined as 
"[dlerivative interest founded on, or growing out of, contract, 
connection, or bond of union between parties."33 Commonality of 
interest, then, is the core of the privity concept.34 As a matter of 
policy, a nonparty should be bound by a judgment if his interests 
and those of an original litigant are sufficiently identical to ensure 
that no dilution of rights occurs.35 
Instead of attempting to define privity in terms of this under- 
lying policy based on common interests, however, courts have 
almost universally resorted to a process of definition by classifica- 
tion. Certain relationships have been held to be privy relation- 
ships to the exclusion of all others. Most jurisdictions are cur- 
rently unwilling to find privity in any relationships other than 
those traditionally recognized." Most of the recognized relation- 
the court's concern for and view of the rights involved in relation to the litigation sought 
to be repeated than on a rigid application of what may be a technically appropriate rule. 
Id. at 17. 
33. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1361 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). 
34. Commonality of interest was traditionally considered to include a requirement of 
mutuality in the application of preclusion. Neither party nor privy could invoke preclusion 
against another unless that person was able to invoke it  against them. Iselin v. C.W. 
Hunter Co., 173 F.2d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1949); Ericson v. Slomer, 94 F.2d 437, 440 (7th 
Cir. 1938) ; 1 A. FREEMAN, supra note 5, a t  # 428; RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS 8 8 93,96, & 
Comment a (1942). 
A trend toward rational extension of the preclusion principles to nonparties is seen 
in the demise of the mutuality doctrine. The foundation for the abandonment of mutuality 
was laid in Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 
P.2d 892 (1942). A limited application of the Bernhard doctrine has been recognized by 
the United States Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foun- 
dation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971). This is the position adopted by the Restatement (Second). 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, Reporter's memorandum a t  xi (Tent. Draft No. 2, 
1975). 
35. See, e.g., United States v. California Bridge & Constr. Co., 245 U.S. 337, 341 
(1917); Litchfield v. Goodnow, 123 U.S. 549, 551 (1887); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS 8 83, 
Comment a (1942). 
36. For a general discussion of privity relationships, see 1 A. FREEMAN, supra note 5, 
a t  $ #  444-501. The following relationships have generally been accorded privy status: 
ancestor-heir: Neagle v. Johnson, 261 F. Supp. 634, 637 (E.D. Mo. 1966); assignor- 
assignee: United States v. New York Terminal Warehouse Co., 233 F.2d 238,241 (5th Cir. 
1956); attorney-client: Dow Chem. Co. v. Benton, 163 Tex. 477, 357 S.W.2d 565 (1962); 
bailor-bailee: Union Ins. Soc'y v. William Gluckin & Co., 353 F.2d 946,953 (2d Cir. 1965); 
lessor-lessee: Kruger & Birch, Inc. v. DuBoyce, 241 F.2d 849, 854 (3d Cir. 1957); 
mortgagor-mortgagee: Lingott v. Bihlmire, 24 Wis. 2d 182,189-89a, 128 N.W.2d 625,628- 
29 (1969); shareholder-corporation: Jordan v. Stuart Creamery, Inc., 258 Iowa 1, 9, 137 
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ships, such as bailor-bailee, lessor-lessee, and assignor-assignee, 
appear to be based on commonality of financial or property inter- 
e s t ~ ; ~ '  parent-child or other familial relationships are conspicu- 
ously absent .38 The understood 
been that "[klinship, whether by 
not create privity, except where 
estate one to the other."39 
meaning of this exclusion has 
affinity or consanguinity, does 
it results in the descent of an 
2. Derivativerights 
A nonparty may also be precluded if he is attempting to 
relitigate a right arguably derived from a party in the first action. 
Although the concept is generally associated with tort law," many 
of the tort cases are relevant to this discussion since they deal 
with familial relationships. The most common derivative action 
is the suit for loss of services or consortium by the spouse of an 
injured party." Since the right to maintain this action is directly 
dependent on the rights of the injured spouse, it is called a deriva- 
tive claim. Once the spouse holding the primary right has liti- 
gated the issue of liability for the injury, a court may preclude 
relitigation of the same issues in an action by the other spouse for 
loss of services and con~ortiurn.~~ A similar situation may occur 
N.W.2d 259, 263 (1965); trustee-bankrupt: Coleman v. Alcock, 272 F.2d 618,622 (5th Cir. 
1959); ward-guardian: New Mexico Veteran's Serv. Comm'r v. United States Van Lines, 
Inc., 325 F.2d 548, 550 (10th Cir. 1963). 
37. In delineating the scope of privity, the Restatement of Judgments uses the follow- 
ing language: 
The rule applies to any form of transfer whether by purchase, gift or opera- 
tion of law. Thus, it  applies to heirs, devisees and others taking by conveyance 
and to receivers, trustees in bankruptcy, purchasers at judicial sale and others 
taking by action of law in judicial process. The rule applied to a transfer of legal 
title or of equitable title or the creation of a lien whether by consent of the 
transferor or by judicial process. 
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS 4 89, Comment c (1942). 
38. Several courts have held specifically that husband and wife are not in privity. 
E.g., Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480 (1956); Palmer v. Clarksdale Hosp., 
213 Miss. 611, 57 So. 2d 476 (1952). But see Fleming v. Cooper, 275 Ark. 634, 284 S.W.2d 
857 (1955). Community property states have held that husband and wife are in privity 
for specific purposes. See, e.g., Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal. 2d 325, 202 P.2d 73 (1949). 
See also 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 7 0.411 (11) (2d ed. 1965). Other courts have 
refused to find privity between parent and child. E.g., Sayre v. Crews, 184 F.2d 723 (5th 
Cir. 1950); Salay v. Ross, 155 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1956). 
39. 1 A. FREEMAN, supra note 5 ,  at § 438. 
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 4 494 (1965). 
41. E.g., Bias v. Ausbury, 369 Mich. 378, 120 N.W.2d 233 (1963). 
42. For cases basing preclusion on derivative rights, see, e.g., Kobmann v. Ross, 374 
Mich. 678, 682, 133 N.W.2d 195, 197 (1965) ("[The husband's] action was derivative and 
dependent on the right of the plaintiff wife to prevail in her suit. Her action having fallen, 
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between parent and child; a parental suit for loss of services or 
medical costs could conceivably be precluded by determination 
of a previous action on behalf of the injured child. The derivative 
rights concept of preclusion is presently a minority view, but is 
recognized as a concept distinct from traditional privity in those 
jurisdictions where it is applied.43 
3. Adequate representation 
Although abstract principles warranting preclusion center on 
the idea of adequate representation, few courts formally recognize 
a distinct doctrine of preclusion based on this concept." There 
are, however, cases which warrant invocation of preclusion princi- 
ples that do not fall within the traditional privity or derivative 
rights classifications. The preclusion of all members of a class in 
a class action suit is such a case.45 Some commentators have 
deemed such actions to be governed by the privity concept,46 but 
the class action suit is essentially based on principles of adequate 
representation. Seldom would all members be found to fall within 
a recognized privity classification. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and the impracticality of massive joinder of 
parties justify the imposition of preclusion on members of a class 
who are neither parties nor privies to the initial class suit.47 
The example of class actions demonstrates the fundamental 
principle of adequate representation. Where claims or issues are 
sufficiently litigated to render subsequent inquiry fruitless, pre- 
clusion should be imposed regardless of the precise relationship 
between the persons bringing the actions. Occasionally courts 
have invoked what is essentially a doctrine of adequate represen- 
tation when unable to impose preclusion within the limits of tra- 
his fell with it."); Sisemore v. Neal, 236 Ark. 574,575,367 S.W.2d 417,419 (1963). Contra, 
Seymour v. Union News Co., 217 F.2d 168, 170 (7th Cir. 1954); Kraut v. Cleveland Ry., 
132 Ohio St. 125, 5 N.E.2d 324 (1936). 
43. See, e.g., Kobmann v. Ross, 374 Mich. 678, 682, 133 N.W.2d 195, 197 (1965); 
Sisemore v. Neal, 236 Ark. 574, 367 S.W.2d 417 (1963). But see Fischbach v. Auto Boys, 
Inc., 106 N.Y .S.2d 416 (Sup. Ct. 1951). 
44. But see In re Air Crash Disaster, 350 F. Supp. 757 (S.D. Ohio 1972), denied, 416 
U.S. 956 (1974). Neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court were willing to 
sanction the district court's finding of preclusion based on adequate representation. 
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85(l)(e) & Comment c (Tent. Draft 
No. 2, 1975) (includes preclusion by class action as an example of representation by a 
party). 
46. Professor McCoid includes class actions along with other examples of privity by 
representation. J. MCCOID, supra note 1, a t  647. 
47. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (providing for strict judicial supervision of class action 
suits). 
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ditional privity .48 For example, in Burns v. Unemployment Com- 
pensation Board of R e ~ i e w , ' ~  the court precluded litigation of a 
claim after a similarly situated individual had brought an action 
based on identical principles. The court ruled that the second 
plaintiff and all like individuals were precluded although they 
were neither parties nor privies to the initial action, since all 
possible issues had been adequately litigated in the first suit." 
Burns is a relatively isolated example, however; no jurisdiction 
has regularly applied the principle of adequate representation to 
justify preclusion. 
4. Application to the parent-child relationship 
The prevailing view has been that the parent-child relation- 
ship does not establish privity and therefore a child cannot be 
bound by a judgment against his parent under that theory. This 
rule has prevailed without regard to the identity of claims or 
issues or to the conclusiveness of the facts involved.51 In some 
instances, however, the policies favoring preclusion are clearly 
served by holding that a child is bound by a judgment binding 
on his parent. In many cases, particularly in personal injury liti- 
gation, these policies can be served without jeopardizing the 
rights of the child. In other circumstances, the imposition of pre- 
clusion on a child after the parent has had his day in court would 
work an injustice despite apparent identity of claims or issues. In 
domestic relations suits, for example, where the relationship be- 
tween parent and child often becomes critical, policies exist that 
may render imposition of preclusion unwarranted and unjust." In 
such intrafamilial disputes the parent cannot always be relied on 
to adequately represent the best interests of the child. 
Since some parent-child cases warrant the invocation of pre- 
clusion and others do not, it may appear that courts are justified 
in adhering to the rigid principles of traditional privity. Arguably, 
it is preferable to allow some unnecessary litigation rather than 
48. E.g., Armstrong v. Armstrong, 15 Cal. 3d 942, 544 P.2d 941, 126 Ca'i. Rptr. 805 
(1976); Burns v. Unemployment Compensation Bd., 164 Pa. Super. Ct. 470, 65 A.2d 445 
(1949) (by implication). 
49. 164 Pa. Super. Ct. 470, 65 A.2d 445 (1949) (per curiam). 
50. Id. at 65 A.2d at 446. The court did not attempt in its per curiam opinion to 
harmonize its decision with basic preclusion and privity principles. 
51. See, e.g., Greenlee v. John G .  Shedd Aquarium, 36 Ill. App. 3d 929, 344 N.E.2d 
788 (1976). 
52. See, e.g., Everett v. Everett, 57 Cal. App. 3d 65, 129 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1976) and text 
accompanying notes 121-27 infra. 
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possibly deprive a child of his substantive rights by improperly 
invoking preclusion. I t  is unnecessary, however, to err a t  all since 
it is possible to distinguish the situations in which preclusion is 
proper from those in which it is not. Alternatively, the need for 
preclusion may be circumvented entirely.53 The ensuing discus- 
sion will analyze cases typical of each situation and seek to facili- 
tate the formulation of a rational approach to both. 
A. Cases Justifying Preclusion 
Provided that the facts meet the criteria for either claim or 
issue preclusion54 and that the parent has adequately represented 
the child's interest in the first action, a court can justifiably pre- 
clude an action brought on behalf of the child after a judgment 
is reached in the action brought by the parent. These require- 
ments are generally satisfied in personal injury litigation. Since 
any recovery on a minor child's claim will usually go to his par- 
ents, they have adequate opportunity and incentive to litigate 
fully the issues or claims on behalf of the child, as well as any 
related claims that they hold independently. 
Two situations arise in personal injury litigation in which 
preclusion could apply to parent-child cases. The most common 
of these situations is that of a multiple injury accident. Where 
parent and child are injured in a single automobile collision, for 
example, each has an independent claim for relief. The issues 
necessary to establish the two claims, however, are generally 
identical. In such a case issue preclusion might be invoked to bar 
unnecessary relitigation. A second situation in which preclusion 
might be applied is that of a single injury to the child. Again two 
claims arise. The child has one cause of action for any injuries 
sustained, while the parent may bring suit for loss of services and 
companionship or for medical expenses. 
1. Personal injury-independent claims 
Preclusion often becomes an issue in cases involving multi- 
passenger automobile accidents since each person injured may 
seek to bring a separate action for damages? In a large percen- 
53. See notes 159-74 and accompanying text infra. 
54. Text accompanying notes 14 (criteria for claim preclusion) and 22 (criteria for 
issue preclusion) supra. 
55. See King, Collateral Estoppel and Motor Vehicle Accident Litigation in New 
York, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1967). The author suggests that automobile accident 
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tage of these cases, the passengers are family members-often 
parents and children. In such cases the ultimate issues necessary 
for a finding of liability or negligence are generally identical for 
all passengers, yet because no privity exists in the traditional 
sense courts have commonly allowed repetitive litigation until 
each claimant has had his day in court. 
The case of Greenlee v. John G.  Shedd AquariumJ6 aptly 
illustrates a court's refusal to apply preclusion where clearly justi- 
fied. In 1957 an automobile carrying the Greenlee family and 
driven by Edgar Greenlee collided with a truck belonging to 
Shedd Aquarium. Two of the children were killed and the remain- 
ing passengers and driver suffered severe injuries." Mrs. Greenlee 
brought suit against Shedd Aquarium and the employee truck 
driver, alleging willful and wanton negligen~e.~~ A jury found 
Greenlee to be the sole cause of the accident and absolved the 
Aquarium from all negligen~e.~The judgment was affirmed on 
appeal .60 
In 1970, the surviving child, Regina Lynn Greenlee, brought 
an action against Shedd Aquarium, the driver of the truck, and 
her father for personal injuries sustained in the accident thirteen 
years earlier." Shedd Aquarium and its employee driver moved 
for summary judgment on the ground that the Greenlee child was 
precluded from relitigation of the same issues. The motion was 
granted. The child then appealed, asserting that preclusion was 
improper because she was neither party nor privy to the initial 
litigati~n.'~ In 1976-almost twenty years after the accident-the 
litigation is an appropriate area for expansion of the preclusion principles beyond the 
traditional limits imposed by privity and mutuality. Id. at  42-47. 
56. 36 Ill. App. 3d 924, 344 N.E.2d 788 (1976). 
57. Greenlee v. John G. Shedd Aquarium, 31 Ill. App. 2d 402, 405, 176 N.E.2d 684, 
686 (1961). 
58. Id. at 408, 176 N.E.2d at  687. The purpose of the willful and wanton negligence 
allegation was to facilitate recovery even in the event that Greenlee was found contributo- 
rily negligent. 
59. Id. at  409, 176 N.E.2d at  688: "The bury] instructions were fair and correct. 
They leave no room for doubt that . . . there was no negligence attributable to defendants 
and that Edgar Greenlee's negligence, and his alone, caused the accident." 
60. Id. at  412, 176 N.E.2d at  689. 
61. Greenlee v. John G. Shedd Aquarium, 36 Ill. App. 3d 924,344 N.E.2d 788 (1976). 
Shedd and the driver of the truck filed motions for summary judgment which were 
granted. Consequently, plaintiffs appeal from the order did not involve the propriety of 
naming her father as a defendant. Id. at  925, 344 N.E.2d at 788-89. 
62. Id. at  925, 344 N.E.2d at  789 (emphasis added): "Plaintiffs only contention on 
appeal is that the granting of defendants' motion for summary judgment on the grounds 
or [sic] collateral estoppel was improper." No allegations of fraud, collusion, or miscon- 
duct in the first action were made. 
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Illinois Court of Appeals overruled the order granting summary 
judgment and remanded the child's action for retrial on the mer- 
i t ~ . ~ ~  Despite the probable futility of additional litigation, the 
appellate court felt bound to follow the traditional privity rules 
that had the effect of exempting the child from preclu~ion.~~ 
In the child's suit, the court could have invoked issue preclu- 
sion since all the necessary elements were presentF The issues 
were identical to those in the original action and the liability 
sought in both cases was based on the same facts. The issues 
involved in the second suit were ultimate ones on which final 
liability would be established, just as in the first case. Finally, the 
issues were fully and conclusively litigated in the first action." 
Not only were the elements of issue preclusion present, the 
policies favoring preclusion clearly outweighed any possible dan- 
ger of diluting the child's rights.67 First, the court failed to give 
effect to one of the fundamental policies favoring preclusion-the 
final repose of decisions. For the effects of a relatively simple 
automobile accident case to span almost two decades, three trial 
court decisions, and two appeals seems to deny the very purpose 
of the court's existence-to resolve disputes. In addition, the 
court ignored the basic policy of discouraging inconsistent judg- 
ments. Allowing relitigation supposes that a viable issue still ex- 
ists between the parties. While relitigation of this case is not 
certain to produce inconsistent results, the possibility is not in- 
63. Id. at 927, 344 N.E.2d at 790. 
64. Id. at 926, 344 N.E.2d at 789-90 (emphasis added): 
It is well established that one is not estopped or barred by a prior litigation if 
he was not a party to such action and does not stand in the relation of privy to 
one who was a party. . . . The concept of privity contemplates a mutual or 
successive relationship to the same property rights which were the subject mat- 
ter of prior adjudication. 
The appellate court held itself bound by pronouncements of the Illinois Supreme Court 
on the preclusion issue. Id. at 927, 344 N.E.2d a t  790, see Smith v. Bishop, 26 Ill. 2d 434, 
187 N.E.2d 217 (1963). 
65. See note 22 supra. 
66. In the opinion in the first Greenlee appeal, the court stated: 
It is argued that the verdict and judgment [against Greenlee] are against the 
manifest weight of the evidence. There is no merit whatsoever in this point. 
. . . .  
. . .Edgar Greenlee's story is refuted by the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence introduced on behalf of the defendants. 
31 Ill. App. 2d at 405, 176 N.E.2d at 686. 
67. The appeal in the second Greenlee case contained no allegations that the child 
had been misrepresented or deprived of any right. The only contention was that tradi- 
tional privity did not bar relitigation by the child after the parent had his day in court on 
the same issues. 36 Ill. App. 3d at 925, 344 N.E.2d at 789. 
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concei~able.~~ Moreover, the court's decision failed to serve the 
policy of avoiding harassing litigation. Years after final resolution 
of the first action, Shedd Aquarium and its employee must un- 
necessarily expend additional time and money defending a sec- 
ond action based on exactly the same issues as before. Finally, the 
failure to invoke preclusion in this case resulted in unnecessary 
delay and additional burden on an already overcrowded court 
system. This is well attested by the six years already expended 
in the second action? 
On the other hand, imposition of preclusion would not have 
diluted the child's rights in this case. No evidence or rationale 
was presented that tended to show that the parent abridged or 
compromised the child's interests in any way. On the contrary, 
the evidence shows that her rights were vigorously repre~ented.'~ 
2. Personal injury-dependent claim 
When a child is injured, the parents have the option of bring- 
ing an action on behalf of the child and in his name or bringing 
the action on behalf of themselves for loss of services and expen- 
ses incurred. While the rights of the parents in such a case create 
a distinct claim, that claim is, of course, dependent on the exis- 
tence of the child's primary claim. It is equally clear that the 
issues will be identical to both claims in such cases and that the 
imposition of preclusion is warranted. 
In Whitehead v. General Telephone Co., parents and child 
brought independent actions for recovery based on the same acci- 
dent. The Whitehead child suffered a burn while using a tele- 
phone during a storm in which the telephone line was struck by 
lightning. Her parents brought an action against the telephone 
company for loss of the child's services, alleging negligence by the 
company's employee in repair work done on the telephone at the 
whitehead residence prior to the accident. A trial on the merits 
resulted in a judgment for the telephone company.72 
- -- 
68. See Whitehead v. General Tel. Co., 20 Ohio St. 2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969). 
69. Regina Lynn Greenlee brought her action in 1970. The summary judgment for 
defendants was not overturned until 1976. 36 Ill. App. 3d at 924-25, 344 N.E.2d at 788- 
89. 
70. While the original Greenlee action did not include a claim for damages on behalf 
of Regina Greenlee, the mother's suit did include wrongful death actions on behalf of her 
two sons and personal injury claims on behalf of herself, her husband, and her surviving 
son. Id. at 925, 344 N.E.2d at 789. Mrs. Greenlee was certainly provided with sufficient 
motivation to exhaustively litigate the issues common to these claims and that of Regina 
Greenlee. 
71. 20 Ohio St. 2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969). 
72. Id. at 109-10, 254 N.E.2d at 11-12. 
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Thereafter, the father brought a second action, this time on 
behalf of the minor child, for the same injuries, alleging the same 
theory of negligence. In this action the Whitehead child pre- 
vailedJ3 The telephone company appealed, claiming that the 
child should have been precluded by the original judgment from 
bringing a second action.74 The arguments on appeal dealt with 
the policies underlying preclu~ion.?~ The intermediate appellate 
court affirmed the lower court's ruling,76 as did the Ohio Supreme 
Court on further appeal." The latter court held that the single 
injury gave rise to two separate causes of action,7s that the par- 
ents' right to recover was in fact derivative of the child's primary 
right,?' but that preclusion could be invoked only to bar relitiga- 
tion by parties or their privies." Since, according to traditional 
concepts, the child was not in privity with the parents, her cause 
of action could not be precluded by their suit. 
As with the Greenlee case, Whitehead contained all the nec- 
essary elements of issue preclusi~n.~~ Apparently, the,court did 
not impose preclusion because the parents and child did not fall 
within one of the classic privity definitions. The Ohio court re- 
jected a more liberal concept of preclusion and demanded the 
traditional privity status before precluding a nonparty. 
Notably, the Whitehead opinion contains dicta indicating 
that in certain circumstances a child may be precluded by a 
73. Id. at 111, 254 N.E.2d at 12. Major Materials Co., a co-defendant in the action, 
settled and was dismissed as a party defendant. The jury then returned a verdict of 
$12,500 against General Telephone Co. and judgment was entered thereon. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 113, 254 N.E.2d at 13-14: "[Alppellant argues that the present case is one 
where the defense of collateral estoppel should be appropriate, and urges that the defini- 
tion and use of the word privity adopted by the courts of Ohio thwarts the policies of the 
doctrine of res judicata." To this the court responded: "In our opinion, the existing Ohio 
requirement that there be an identity of parties or their privies is founded upon the sound 
principle that all persons are entitled to their day in court. The doctrine of res judicata 
. . . should not be permitted to encroach upon fundamental and imperative rights." Id. 
at 116, 254 N.E.2d at 15. 
76. Unreported opinion of the Lucas County Court of Appeals. 
77. 20 Ohio St. 2d at 116, 254 N.E.2d at 15. 
78. Id. at 112-13, 254 N.E.2d at 13. See also Weiand v. City of Akron, 13 Ohio App. 
2d 73, 233 N.E.2d 880, 882 (1968) (holding that injury to daughter gave rise to two claims: 
the daughter's claim for damages resulting from personal injury, and her parents' claim 
for damages resulting from loss of services and for medical expenses). 
79. 20 Ohio St. 2d at 115, 254 N.E.2d at 15: "In the present case, the parent's cause 
of action for loss of services and medical expenses of the minor child, although derivative, 
does not arise by way of succession from an estate or interest of the minor child." See 
Conold v. Stem, 138 Ohio St. 352, 366, 35 N.E.2d 133, 140-41 (1941). But see notes 144- 
46 and accompanying text infm. 
80. 20 Ohio St. 2d at 114, 254 N.E.2d at 13. 
81. See note 22 supra. 
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judgment binding on his parent.82 Such circumstances include 
cases where the child is a nominal party, whether or not he ac- 
tively participates in or controls the litigation; where the child is 
a real party in interest;83 or where the parent and child are in 
actual privity under one of the traditional classifications." La- 
mentably, the court in Whitehead did not perceive that the desir- 
ability of precluding the second suit would not have been en- 
hanced even had one or more of the above circumstances been 
applicable .85 
The Whitehead court's failure to apply preclusion served, as 
in Greenlee, to undermine the basic policies supporting preclu- 
sion. The defendant telephone company was denied the protec- 
tion of a reasonable assumption of finality after it had prevailed 
once in a trial on the merits. Furthermore, the court's decision 
underscores the absurdity of inconsistent judgments; the tele- 
phone company was found negligent and therefore liable for the 
injury to the Whitehead child, but not negligent and therefore not 
liable for the loss of services to her parents resulting from the 
same injury. The relitigation of the same issues by nominally 
different parties and the consequent increase in expense and time 
to the defendant can certainly be characterized as harassing. Fi- 
nally, the addition of another full trial on the merits and two 
appeals placed an unwarranted burden on the court system. 
Moreover, there was no contention that the Whitehead child was 
inadequately represented by her parents in the initial litigation. 
B. Cases Not Justifying Preclusion 
In contrast to the personal injury cases discussed above, 
82. 20 Ohio St. 2d at 114, 254 N.E.2d at 14: "We have also held that the term 'parties' 
includes those who are directly interested in the subject matter of a suit, who have a right 
to make a defense, or who control the proceedings." While this statement refers to what 
is ordinarily called a real party in interest, the court went on to say in this case the child 
was not a real party in interest because he did not control the litigation in any way. Id. 
at 115-16, 254 N.E.2d at 15. 
83. See notes 133-43 and accompanying text infra. 
84. If parent and child are in a relationship of assignor and assignee, for example, 
privity could be found in that context. E.g., Rafferty v. Buckler, 94 Ky. 96, 23 S.W. 947 
(1893). 
85. Claim preclusion could arguably be invoked in Whitehead by alleging that the 
two claims arose as a result of splitting a single cause of action. Under the transactional 
view of what constitutes a claim, this would undoubtedly be so. See McConnel v. Travel- 
ers Indemnity Co., 346 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1965); note 15 supra. It is notable that McConnel 
was decided under a Louisiana law that is more restrictive than that of most states in 
requiring identity of parties and causes of action. See LA. CN. CODE ANN. art. 2286 (West 
1965). See generally Blume, The Scope of a Cause of Action-Elimination of the Splitting 
Trap, 38 MICH. ST. B.J., Dec. 1959, a t  10. 
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domestic relations cases often involve countervailing policies that 
render imposition of preclusion improper. In divorce and filiation 
proceedings, the interests of parent and child may not be identi- 
cal? Consequently, the parent cannot always be relied on to 
represent fully the child's rights. Should the child's right be com- 
promised by a parent in either type of action, imposition of pre- 
clusion in a subsequent action brought by the child would be 
unjust. Naturally, there are cases in which the parent adequately 
represents the child's interests. It is difficult, however, to distin- 
guish between the cases in which the child's interests are suffi- 
ciently represented and those in which the child's interests are 
compromised. To avoid this difficulty, most courts have adhered 
to the traditional privity rules in domestic relations suits, denying 
preclusive effect without an in-depth examination of whether or 
not it is warranted. 
To inflexibly deny preclusion in domestic relations cases 
serves to insure preservation of rights, but offends the fundamen- 
tal preclusion policies. Besides fostering the possibility of incon- 
sistent judgments, postponed finality, and overburdened courts, 
denial of preclusion in divorce or filiation cases allows relitigation 
of potentially embarassing and harassing questions. An examina- 
tion of some pertinent divorce and filiation cases reveals the na- 
ture of this conflict of policies in this area and points the way to 
an effective solution to the preclusion/rights problem. 
1.  Divorce proceedings 
Most questions concerning parent-child preclusion in divorce 
proceedings center on the issue of child support." Since a parent 
bringing a contested divorce action may be more concerned with 
expeditious dissolution of the marriage than with the provision of 
adequate child support, a conflict of interests between parent and 
child may arise. 
The most extreme cases of this nature are those in which 
support is denied based on a finding of nonpaternity in the di- 
vorce action." Traditionally, the issue of paternity has been liti- 
gated without the participation of the child whose paternity was 
in question.89 If the child brings a subsequent suit for support 
86. See Everett v. Everett, 57 Cal. App. 3d 65, 129 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1976). 
87. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Armstrong, 15 Cal. 3d 942, 544 P.2d 941, 126 Cal. Rptr. 
805 (1976); Stewart v. Stewart, 86 Cal. 3d 108, 110, 383 P.2d 617, 619 (1963). 
88. See generally Comment, R ~ S  Judicata and Paternity, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 486 
(1965). 
89. But see Ohms v. Ohms, 285 App. Div. 839, 137 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1955); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. $1) 552.251-.255 (1967). 
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dependent on filial status, courts are reluctant to deny him the 
opportunity to litigate the issue since, according to traditional 
classifications, the child is neither party to the initial action nor 
in privity with his parent. Thus, the child would not be bound 
by any decision on the issues.g0 In such cases, the traditional 
privity rules serve to protect the child. 
The rights of the child, however, are not always jeopardized 
by imposition of preclusion in subsequent litigation. There is 
some assurance that the custodial parent of a child will ade- 
quately protect the child's financial interests, since that parent 
will generally be responsible for the child's care and also be the 
direct recipient of any support awarded by the court. Moreover, 
in many cases the issues, including paternity, are established by 
unequivocal evidence; hence, there is no justification for allowing 
a second day in court. 
The difficulty in distinguishing those cases in which preclu- 
sion is proper from those in which it is not is illustrated by 
Gonzales v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Iwgl There, when a child 
brought an action for wrongful death of his putative father, the 
court admitted into evidence a judgment in a prior divorce decree 
in which the child had been declared not to be the offspring of 
the deceased maneg2 The child's action was accordingly dismissed. 
On appeal, the case was remanded for trial because the paternity 
determination was held not to be binding on the child who had 
not been made a party to the original divorce proceeding." 
In such a case, the propriety of preclusion is dependent upon 
the conclusiveness of the facts upon which nonpaternity is estab- 
lished. It is perfectly clear from the Gonzales opinion that the 
court was convinced that the child's rights may have been 
abridged in the divorce proceeding. That possibility made appli- 
cation of preclusion improper." The dilemma lies in the fact that 
the court could not protect the rights of the child without creating 
90. See, e.g., Shatford v. Shatford, 214 Ark. 612, 217 S.W.2d 917 (1949). See also 
Adamson v. Adamson, 209 Cal. App. 492, 498, 26 Cal. Rptr. 236, 241 (1962) (dictum). 
Contra, Richardson v. Borders, 246 Ky. 303, 54 S.W.2d 676 (1932). 
91. 34 Cal. 2d 749, 214 P.2d 809 (1950). 
92. Id. at 751, 214 P.2d at 810. The decision was also based on a California statute 
allowing only a spouse or a descendant of the natural or putative parent to challenge 
legitimacy. See CAL. CIV. CODE # 195 (West 1954). 
93. 34 Cal. 2d a t  753, 756, 214 P.2d at 811, 813. 
94. The divorce was uncontested. The mother of the child alleged in that proceeding 
that her husband was not the child's natural father; she asked for no support. In the 
wrongful death action brought by the child, the mother repudiated her former testimony, 
claiming that she had lied in the divorce proceeding to prevent the court from possibly 
awarding custody of the child to her husband. 34 Cal. 2d at 753, 214 P.2d at 811. 
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the possibility of inconsistent judgments. 
Few courts have addressed this dilemma. In Daniels u. 
Daniels,95 the court attempted to rationalize the problem of in- 
consistent judgments on identical facts, but did so by attacking 
the symptoms instead of the problem. In this case a prior divorce 
decree had included a finding of nonpaternity on the part of the 
natural mother's husband. In a subsequent action for support 
brought by the child, the ex-husband entered into evidence the 
former judgment to deny responsibility for child support. The 
court held that the child was not bound by the adjudication of 
nonpaternity since she was neither party nor privy to the initial 
l i t i g a t i ~ n . ~ ~  The court realized that remanding the case for trial 
raised the possibility of inconsistent judgments." In order to 
avoid this potential result, the court reexamined the first decision 
and determined that the divorce decree did not adjudicate the 
issue of paternity as to the child, but only as to the mother. In 
other words, the finding of nonpaternity in the first action merely 
estopped the mother from asserting that her ex-husband was the 
child's father; the finding did not actually determine paternity.98 
The Daniels rationale provides an inadequate remedy to the 
problem of inconsistent judgments. It fails to take into account 
the nature of the evidence on which nonpaternity is established 
or the adequacy of representation of the child on the support 
issue. No evidence of fraud or collusion was adverted to in 
Daniels, yet the court felt bound to follow the traditional privity 
doctrine rather than to attempt to measure the relative conclu- 
siveness of the original finding. 
A minority of courts have chosen to avoid the possibility of 
inconsistent judgments on divorce issues by precluding subse- 
quent litigation. Yarborough v. Yarboroughgg relied on a Georgia 
statutelM that specifically made a "consent (or other) decree in a 
divorce suit, fixing permanent alimony for a minor child. . .bind- 
ing upon [the child]. . ."lol On appeal, the United States Su- 
95. 143 Cal. App. 2d 430, 300 P.2d 335 (1956). 
96. Id., 300 P.2d at 341. 
97. Id., 300 P.2d at 341: "It is true that the implied finding that Gabrielle is not the 
defendant's child and the express statement in the conclusions that no determination is 
made as to her paternity, present an apparent conflict which must be reconciled if possible 
in aid of the judgment." 
98. Id., 300 P.2d at 340. 
99. 168 S.C. 46, 166 S.E. 877 (1932), reu'd, 290 U.S. 202 (1933). 
100. GA. CODE ANN. # 30-207 (1969). 
101. 290 U S .  at 210. See also RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS 5 85 (1942); 2 A. FREEMAN, 
supra note 5, at # 911. 
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preme Court relied on the full faith and credit provision of the 
Constitutionloz to hold the Georgia divorce decree binding on the 
child in the courts of another state where the second action was 
brought.lo3 Significantly, the dissent made an attempt to relate 
the preclusive effect of the judgment to the persuasiveness of the 
merits by adverting to the question of adequate representation of 
the child's interests.lo4 
If preclusion were made contingent on the relative conclu- 
siveness of the factual determinations in each case, the problem 
of inconsistent judgments would be partially circumvented. In 
cases where no doubt exists regarding the merits of an initial 
decision, preclusion in a subsequent action cannot result in injus- 
tice. If, however, a court is unable to ascertain the validity of the 
factual conclusions in a previous suit, imposition of preclusion in 
a subsequent suit may infringe the rights of the second litigant. 
Domestic relations suits present this dichotomy since compro- 
mise or collusion may affect some judgments while other judg- 
ments may be established with near absolute certainty. For ex- 
ample, in cases where nonpaternity is established through the use 
of blood group exclusion tests, no doubt exists upon which to base 
a protective policy of nonpreclusion . lo5 
Unfortunately, such a sifting process is not procedurally fea- 
sible under present privity practices. To determine that preclu- 
sion is justified by privity and that parent and child are in privity 
only when the facts are conclusive enough to warrant preclusion 
creates a circular argument, not a useful rule. In addition, it is 
unreasonable to expect the trial judge in a subsequent suit 
brought by a child to know when collusion between spouses in the 
previous divorce action may have colored the evidence. An ade- 
quate solution must provide protection of rights and insurance 
against unnecessary relitigation.lo6 
- -- 
102. U.S. CONST. art. N ,  6 1. 
103. 290 U.S. at 210, 213. 
104. 290 U.S. at 214 n.1 (Stone, J., dissenting). 
105. The validity of a number of blood grouping tests is now undisputed. The total 
number of phenotypes existing under seventeen readily available tests exceeds 55 million. 
Norway, Sweden, and Denmark have established national blood typing centers that ena- 
ble their courts to prove nonpaternity in approximately 90 percent of those cases in which 
a false accusation has been made. See generally H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL 
POLICY 123-37 (1971). Many spurious relitigations of paternity could be eliminated by 
adopting a similar plan in the United States. Legislation has been proposed to establish 
and fund a number of national blood typing stations. See S. REP. NO. 93-533, 93d Cong. 
1st Sess. (1973). These provisions, originally proposed in H.R. 3153, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1973), were omitted when the bill was enacted into law. See Act of Dec. 31, 1973, Pub. 
L. No. 93-233, 87 Stat. 947 (1974). 
106. See notes 159-74 and accompanying text infra. 
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2. Filiation proceedings 
Filiation proceedings, also known as paternity or bastardy 
suits, present an even stronger conflict of policies than do divorce 
proceedings.lo7 The illegitimate child is often an unwanted child, 
and courts are naturally skeptical of the adequacy of representa- 
tion by the natural mother. There is a resulting reluctance to 
apply preclusion based on such representation. Moreover, lower 
courts are becoming more aware of the need to protect the inter- 
ests of illegitimates as a result of changing social attitudes toward 
illegitimacy108 and recent Supreme Court cases securing for ille- 
gitimate~ many substantive rights.lo9 
At the same time, the policies favoring preclusion become 
even more critical.l1° A determination of nonpaternity should pro- 
vide an accused man with some assurance of finality, especially 
if accomplished through the use of blood grouping tests. Inconsis- 
tency of judgments in paternity actions is less tolerable than in 
personal injury litigation; a man is either the father of a child or 
he is not. Irreconcilable decisions would seem to indicate that one 
court had failed in its duty to provide a forum for just adjudica- 
tion of disputes. Finally, unnecessary relitigation of the paternity 
issue is among the most harassing actions imaginable. 
The diversity of state paternity statuteslll presents a major 
107. For background on the nature of filiation proceedings and the problems inherent 
therein, see H. KRAUSE, supra note 105. 
108. Although the illegitimate has historically been shunned by his society, the need 
for protection of illegitimates' rights was recognized early in the development of the 
common law. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *447. Despite the fact that discrimination 
against illegitimates was considered odious and unjust, a t  common law no duty of support 
was immposed on the father of an illegitimate child. Such a duty is wholly statutory, with 
the exception of Kansas which has found a nonstatutory duty of support. See Grayson v. 
Grayson, 182 Kan. 285,320 P.2d 803 (1958). All states now provide for filiation proceedings 
to establish paternity and require support in addition to providing numerous other social 
and economic benefits unknown earlier in this century. IDAHO CODE § 7-1105 (Cum, Supp. 
1976); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. fi 13.01-06 (Vernon 1975); H. KRAUSE, supra note 105, a t  22. 
109. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. American Guar. Liability Ins. 
Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). But see Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (suggesting a 
tapering off of the liberal trend established by Levy and Glona). 
110. The magnitude of the problem is demonstrated by the number of potential 
paternity actions that arise each year. "The case by case battle over specific statutes or 
rules of common law could go on for decades without bringing meaningful results for the 
mass of illegitimates who now make up some ten percent of newly born children." Krause, 
The Uniform Parentage Act, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1, 9 (1975). 
111. The filiation proceeding has been variously characterized. In most jurisdictions 
it  is civil. E.g., Gordon v. Cole, 54 Misc. 2d 967, 283 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Fam. Ct. 1967); State 
v. Volz, 156 Ohio St. 60, 100 N.E.2a 203 (1951). In some it  is classed as quasi-criminal; 
this classification is reflected in the standard of proof required. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 52.355 (West Supp. 1969). In a few jurisdictions the action is criminal, being essentially 
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obstacle to formulation of a uniform policy of preclusion in filia- 
tion proceedings. Since a majority of states regard the proceeding 
as essentially civil and limited to an in personam action for sup- 
port rights,l12 it is appropriate to restrict the analysis for preclu- 
sion purposes to those cases. 
The paramount problem in applying preclusion to filiation 
proceedings concerns the party bringing the action. Authority 
exists among the states for allowing the suit to be maintained by 
the mother,l13 the child (by next friend-or guardian ad litem),l14 
the prosecuting attorney upon the mother's complaint,l15 or a 
designated state agency.l16 Most courts readily admit, however, 
that the primary purpose of the action is to establish the child's 
support rights?' Some courts specify that regardless of who 
brings the action, the child is the real party in interest.l18 This 
ambiguity as to who is in fact bringing the action can cause 
conflicting decisions about the preclusive effects of a former judg- 
ment on the issue of paternity. 
In Stevens v. Kelley,llg a California appellate court held that 
a judgment with respect to a mother in a paternity suit also binds 
the child. A guardian ad litem brought the case on behalf of an 
illegitimate minor to establish a duty of support in the natural 
father. Since a determination of nonpaternity had already been 
made in an action by the mother, the court precluded the guard- 
ian's suit.120 The court held that since the purpose of the first 
action was to establish support for the child, he was the real party 
in interest. That the child was not a nominal party in the first 
action made no difference.121 
a prosecution for the crime of bastardy. E.g., PA. CONS. STAT. § 4506 (1963). See generally 
Comment, Bastardy Proceeding-Civil or Criminal?, 25 TEMPLE L.Q. 364 (1952). 
112. See, e.g., Boyles v. Brown, 69 Mich. App. 480, 245 N.W.2d 100 (1976); Cessna 
v. Montgomery, 63 Ill. 2d 71, 344 N.E.2d 447 (1976); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106 314, $ 9  54, 55 
(1973); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 1)1) 722.711-.729 (1954). 
113. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. 1) 579-1 (1968). 
114. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. # 12-621 (1956). 
115. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. 1) 34-702 (1962). 
116. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. 1) 19-5-101 (1974). 
117. E.g., Kuser v. Orkis, 169 Conn. 66, 362 A.2d 943, 945-46 (1975); People v. Wil- 
liams, 8 Ill. App. 3d 821, 823-24, 291 N.E.2d 323, 325 (1972); Boyles v. Brown, 69 Mich. 
App. 480, 245 N.W .2d 100 (1976); In re J., 50 App. Div. 2d 890, 891, 377 N.Y .S.2d 530, 
531 (1975); State v. Klinker, 85 Wash. 2d 509, 521, 537 P.2d 268, 278 (1975). 
118. E.g., Kyne v. Kyne, 38 Cal. App. 2d 122, 100 P.2d 806, 811 (1940). 
119. 57 Cal. App. 2d 318, 134 P.2d 56 (1943). 
120. Id., 134 P.2d at 59. The holding of Stevens was not an isolated phenomenon, 
devoid of practical implications. The case is cited in a California family law practice 
handbook for the proposition that a minor is bound by a judgment with respect to his 
parent in a paternity proceeding. 1 CALIFORNIA F MILY LA- § 18.8 (1961). 
121. 57 Cal. App. 2d 318, 134 P.2d a t  59. See CAL. CIV. CODE 4 196a (West Supp. 
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Stevens exemplifies a court's willingness to find preclusion 
whenever relitigation of claims or issues appears unnecessary. 
The case is not consistent, however, with the mainstream of pre- 
clusion law or the policies concerning the protection of minor's 
rights. The child was not in privity with the parent in the tradi- 
tional sense in this case, nor is it clear that his parent represented 
him adequately. The Stevens court also appears to have disre- 
garded the relative conclusiveness of the nonpaternity finding in 
reaching its decision, since it refers to the compromise of the 
child's rights by the mother in the first action as an acceptable 
practice.l" On this point a majority of states disagree with 
Stevens, holding that a mother's release or compromise of the 
child's support rights is not binding in the child's subsequent 
action. 123 
In the 1976 case of Everett v.  E ~ e r e t t , ' ~ ~  another California 
appellate court disparaged the Stevens holding. In the original 
Everett case, the mother brought an action to adjudicate the 
paternity of her illegitimate child. Oral and documentary evi- 
dence was presented to a jury. Thereafter, the mother and puta- 
tive father had filed a written stipulation providing that the judge 
should take the case from the jury and that the stipulation should 
be considered as the mother's testimony. On the basis of that 
stipulation, the putative father had prevailed and a finding of 
nonpaternity had been made.125 
A year later the child brought through a guardian ad 
litem, alleging that the defendant in the prior suit was in fact the 
child's natural father and that the former judgment was collusive, 
being the product of an agreement to pay the mother a lump sum 
of money and an annuity of substantial ~ a 1 u e . l ~ ~  The putative 
father demurred, claiming that the judgment in the mother's 
earlier suit precluded any subsequent litigation of the issue. The 
trial court agreed and accordingly dismissed the child's 
1976); CAL. CN. PROC. CODE $ 369 (West 1973). 
122. 57 Cal. App. 2d 318, 134 P.2d at  61: "There is no Code section which specifically 
denies the mother of an illegitimate child authority to compromise claims of the child in 
an action for support brought by the mother on behalf of the child against the alleged 
father." 
123. E.g., Kamp v. Morang, 277 Ala. 575,579,173 So. 2d 566,569-70 (1964); Gammon 
v. Cobb, 335 So. 2d 261, 266-67 (Fla. 1976). 
124. 57 Cal. App. 3d 65, 129 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1976). 
125. Id. a t  67, 129 Cal. Rptr. a t  9-10. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. a t  67-68, 129 Cal. ~ ~ t r :  a t  10. 
128. Id. at  68, 129 Cal. Rptr. a t  10. 
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On appeal, the court in Everett resolved the problem of in- 
suring that the minor child's rights were not diluted by holding 
that he was not bound by the judgment with respect to his 
mother.129 The decision failed to resolve another dilemma, how- 
ever. Since, under existing law, the mother retains the right to 
bring the action130 but the child is not bound by any decision 
rendered in her case, judicial economy suffers, as do the other 
interests protected by the preclusion doctrines. 
It appears that the Everett case presented an apt situation 
for application of issue preclusion with one qualification-the 
possibility of collusion and compromise in the mother's original 
action tended to undermine the probability that the judgment in 
Everett was on the merits. If the defendant were indeed the father 
of the illegitimate child and the child's interests were not ade- 
quately provided for in the collusive settlement purportedly en- 
tered into by the mother, then preclusion in the Everett case 
would have resulted in abridgment of the child's right to support. 
Yet it is not always easy to determine if collusion occurred in a 
previous suit. Preclusion in such cases would be subverted en- 
tirely if the party desiring to relitigate had merely to allege impro- 
priety to secure a second day in court. As with the divorce cases, 
the courts in filiation proceedings are faced with the question 
whether they can adequately distinguish between cases warrant- 
ing imposition of preclusion and those in which the policies favor- 
ing preclusion must be subordinated to other interests. 
The cases discussed above clearly demonstrate that the judi- 
cial practice of rigidly refusing to apply preclusion to the parent- 
child relationship because of traditional privity rules works a dis- 
service to our system of resolving disputes. Often the courts have 
allowed harassing litigation and inconsistent judgments by ad- 
hering to the traditional rules. Conversely, some attempts to in- 
voke preclusion in parent-child cases have failed to take into 
129. Id. at 70-71, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 12; See CAL. CIV. CODE 4 231 (West 1954). In so 
holding, the court borrowed a principle from the probate code providing that a minor's 
right cannot be compromised without judicial sanction. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 1431 (West 
1956). 
130. Everett was brought under CAL. CIV. CODE § 231 (West 1954), which allows the 
mother to bring the action. This statute has since been replaced by the Uniform Parentage 
Act, CAL. CIV. CODE $ 4  7001-7018 (West Supp. 1976). Under the new law, the mother 
retains authority to bring the action, but the problem of preclusion is obviated by the 
inclusion of a mandatory joinder provision under which the child must be made a nominal 
party. 
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account possible parental compromise of a child's rights.13' In 
some cases the application of preclusion is just and desirable. 
Even when countervailing factors such as minors' rights are ab- 
sent, under present practices judges have no reasonable alterna- 
tive but to deny preclusion. Courts presently lack the procedural 
tools to sift cases and apply preclusion only to those that factually 
warrant it. Forward-looking jurisdictions are, however, currently 
testing major procedural changes in order to promote judicial 
economy through application of preclusion.132 The three major 
devices which courts have invoked to prevent unnecessary litiga- 
tion are the real party in interest rule, expanded concept of priv- 
ity, and mandatory joinder. 
A. Real Party in Interest Rule 
Many jurisdictions have attempted to avoid the problems 
that result in multiple litigation of single claims and issues by 
adopting a real party in interest ru1e.l" Such a rule typically 
provides that "every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the 
real party in interest."134 Because the person whose rights are 
being adjudicated will be a nominal party under this rule, theo- 
retically no compromise of the interested party's rights is possi- 
ble.'% In a suit by a parent regarding the child's rights, the child 
would then be made a nominal party, in which case a guardian 
ad litem would be appointed to protect his interests. 
The Kansas Supreme Court has held its state's real party in 
131. E.g., Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933); Stevens v. Kelley, 57 Cal. 
App. 2d 318, 134 P.2d 56 (1943). 
132. The Supreme Court of Nebraska has recognized the necessity for an expanded 
privity concept, balanced by considerations of fairness: "In all cases in which a person 
finds himself subject to preclusion generally, either (1) he has had the opportunity to 
litigate the matter or (2) his interests have been adequately represented in the litigation 
of the matter." Vincent v. Peter Pan Bakers, Inc., 182 Neb. 206, 207-08, 153 N.W.2d 849, 
850 (1967). See id. at 211, 153 N.W. at  851-52 (Carter, J., concurring). Likewise, the 
California Supreme Court justified an expanded application of preclusion to meet the 
needs of limiting litigation: "As has been said in considering the application of the doc- 
trine [of privity], courts examine the practicalities of the situation and attempt to deter- 
mine whether plaintiffs are 'sufficiently close to the original case to afford application of 
the principle of preclusion."' Armstrong v. Armstrong, 15 Cal. 3d 942, 951, 544 P.2d 941, 
946, 126 Cal. Rptr. 805, 810 (1976). 
133. E.g., FED. R. CN. P. 17(a); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-217(a) (1964). No adequate 
definition of a real party in interest has been promulgated. See Kennedy, Federal Rule 
17(a): Will the Real Party in Interest Please Stand?, 51 MINN. L. REV. 675 (1967). 
134. FED. R. CN. P. 17(a). 
135. In the case of a minor, representation is mandatory. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. PRoc. 
CODE § 372 (West 1973). This does not necessarily prevent any compromise of a child's 
interest, however, since an unsympathetic parent may represent the child generally or as 
guardian ad litem. But see note 170 and accompanying text infm. 
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interest statute136 applicable to filiation proceedings.13' In doing 
so, the court noted that the purpose of the statute is to prevent 
harassing multiple suits on the same claim by persons other than 
nominal parties.ls8 By holding the rule applicable to filiation 
suits, the court has insured that the child, indisputably the real 
party in interest, is also the nominal party. Theoretically, a par- 
ent would then have no opportunity to enter into a covert agree- 
ment compromising the child's support rights. The court's opin- 
ion includes dicta indicating that a judgment for or against the 
putative father in a filiation suit brought by the child as real 
party in interest would be conclusive as to the child and a bar to 
any others. 139 
While the real party in interest rule appears to be an effective 
solution in the context of filiation proceedings, the rule has not 
been without criticism.140 Since it is difficult in any given factual 
situation to identify the real party in interest, commentators have 
criticized the rule as being confusing and without function, par- 
ticularly in cases where an individual is represented in litigation 
by an institution such as an insurer.141 Even in filiation cases the 
rule conflicts with most state paternity statutes that specifically 
allow persons other than the child to bring the action.ld2 Criti- 
cisms of the rule reached fruition when New York abolished its 
real party in interest rule in 1957 after scholars convinced the 
legislature that the purposes of the rule were better served by 
other devices.ld3 Despite the fact that the rule has been used to 
some effect in Kansas filiation proceedings, the same criticism 
applies to parent-child cases; other devices better serve the needs 
of both preclusion and protection of rights. 
B. Extension of the Privity Concept 
An obvious way to bring the parent-child relationship within 
136. KAN. STAT. ANN. 8 60-217(a) (1964). 
137. Lawrence v. Boyd, 207 Kan. 776, 779-80, 486 P.2d 1394, 1397 (1971). 
138. Id. a t  779, 486 P.2d a t  1397. 
139. Id. 
140. E.g., Atkinson, The Real Party in Interest Rule: A Plea for Its Abolition, 32 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 926 (1957); Kennedy, supra note 133. 
141. See Kennedy, supra note 133, a t  693-97, 701-03, 714-16. 
142. Given the current status of most state laws it would be difficult to formulate a 
coherent real party in interest rule that would comport with the existing paternity stat- 
utes. Indeed, the Colorado Supreme Court has ruled that the child whose paternity is in 
question has no party status and may not be present in the court room, since his appear- 
ance might unduly sway a jury. See People ex rel. R.D.S., 183 Colo. 89, 514 P.2d 772 
(1973). 
143. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW $ 1004 (McKinney 1976). 
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the purview of the preclusion doctrine is to expand the traditional 
privity ~ 0 n c e p t . l ~ ~  Limitations must be placed on such expansion, 
however. A blanket application of preclusion to parent-child rela- 
tionships would increase the potential for inequities resulting 
from compromise or collusion. Consequently, merely extending 
the privity list to include parent and child is not an appropriate 
solution. It should be recognized, however, that the principles of 
derivative rights145 and adequate repre~entat ion'~~ are in essence 
a qualified extension of the preclusion doctrine beyond the tradi- 
tional limits imposed by privity. 
The derivative rights principle applies to those cases in 
which a single claim"' is sought to be litigated by both parent and 
child.'" Many courts consider actions by a spouse for loss of con- 
sortium or services to be derivative claims, wherein the party 
claiming damages for loss of intangible rights holds such a claim 
only through the injured party. If the primary right arising from 
the injury fails, the derivative right must fail also, and thus is 
subject to preclusion. The derivative rights principle serves 
equally well in parent-child cases based on loss of services or 
companionship and may apply to parental actions for medical 
costs. Basing preclusion on derivative rights principles prevents 
the problems of multiple litigation and inconsistent judgments 
found in the Whitehead case149 and in similar circumstances. 
A few jurisdictions have found exigent circumstances suffi- 
cient to preclude strangers who had neither privy status nor a 
derivative claim.150 Professor Allan D. Vestal notes this growing 
trend to apply preclusion to nonparty-nonprivies under carefully 
scrutinized situations.151 Two elements which he finds to be com- 
144. See notes 33-39 and accompanying text supra. 
145. Notes 40-43 and accompanying text supra. 
146. Notes 44-50 and accompanying text supra. 
147. See notes 15-17, supra. 
148. See Whitehead v. General Tel. Co., 20 Ohio St. 2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969). 
In concluding that the single injury gave rise to two distinct claims, the court apparently 
resorted to a primary-right or similar definition of "claim." Under the modern transac- 
tional view, the accident in Whitehead would be held to produce a single claim, splitting 
of which would invoke preclusion. See note 79 supra. 
149. Whitehead v. General Tel. Co., 20 Ohio St. 2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969). 
150. Mass accident cases provide the clearest example of such an exigency. See In re 
Air Crash Disaster, 350 I?. Supp. 757 (S.D. Ohio 1972), rev'd sub mm. Humphreys v. 
Tann, 487 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 956 (1974). In the Air Crash 
case, the district court invoked adequate representation as grounds for precluding addi- 
tional litigation after the initial litigant lost. The Sixth Circuit, however, was unwilling 
to make this radical departure from traditional notions of privity. But see Esco Corp. v. 
Tru-Rol Co., 352 F. Supp. 416 (D. Md. 1972). 
151. Vestal, Res JudicatalPreclusion: Expansion, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 357 (1974). 
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mon to all such situations are (1) a close relationship between the 
two actions-not necessarily between the partiesls2-and (2) ade- 
quate representation of the party to be precluded.ls3 While many 
of the cases in which this expanded preclusion concept is applied 
seem limited to narrow factual holdings, the opinions often speak 
in terms of its general application.ls4 
Few courts have been willing to apply an expanded preclu- 
sion concept to the parent-child relationship. In Armstrong u. 
Armstrong, lss however, the California Supreme Court extended 
the doctrine of adequate representation to include that relation- 
ship. In this case the children of a divorced couple sought to 
relitigate financial rights determined in a prior divorce action to 
which the mother was a party. While California has been a lead- 
ing jurisdiction in expanding the preclusion doctrines,ls6 
Armstrong is among the first cases clearly applying adequate 
representation as a basis for preclusion within the parent-child 
relation: ls7 
152. Id. at  373. This was one argument presented by the appellants in Whitehead. 
See 20 Ohio St. 2d at  113, 254 N.E.2d a t  13-14. 
153. Vestal, supra note 151, at 373. Commentators have justified expansion of preclu- 
sion by imposing various limitations on its application. A deceptively simple argument is 
that if the interests of the litigants are sufficiently identical, preclusion will not be unjust. 
This limitation is insufficient since it ignores the fact that litigants may not attach the 
same significance to identical interests, and compromise may infect an initial judgment. 
See Note, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 724 (1967). 
Other proposed limitations that might justify application of an expanded preclusion 
principle are (1) the requirement of a significant relationship, (2) imposition of preclusion 
only where an inconsistency in verdicts exists, and (3) application of preclusion only where 
the first litigant had incentive and did in fact fully litigate all issues sought to be reliti- 
gated. McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REV. 707, 714-17, 
731 (1976). Unfortunately, these limitations suffer from vagueness and provide an insuffi- 
cient standard with which to measure the probability of collusion or compromise. 
154. Vestal, supra note 151, a t  380. See, e.g., Cauefield v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 378 
F.2d 876 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.  1009 (1967); Esco Corp. v. Tru-Rol Co., 352 F. 
Supp. 416, 428 (D. Md. 1972). 
A yet unresolved question is the extent to which courts may apply preclusion to 
nonparties and still comply with the due process requirements of the United States Con- 
stitution. See Vestal, The Constitution and PreclusionlRes Judicata, 62 MICH. L. REV. 33, 
47-53 (1963). 
155. 15 Cal. 3d 942, 948, 544 P.2d 941, 946, 126 Cal. Rptr. 805, 810 (1976). 
156. See Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 
P.2d 892 (1942). 
157. 15 Cal. 3d at  948, 544 P.2d at  946, 126 Cal. Rptr. a t  810. Although the court 
considered the nature of the relationship to be within the "privity" rubric, California has 
applied the term to cases not within the traditional classification scheme. Here it was 
based on adequacy of representation. See People v. Drinkhouse, 4 Cal. App. 3d 931, 937- 
38, 84 Cal. Rptr. 773, 776-77 (1970); People v. One 1964 Chevrolet, 274 Cal. App. 2d 720, 
804, 79 Cal. Rptr. 447, 453-54 (1969); notes 44-50 and accompanying text supra. 
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We have previously held that privity exists where the person 
involved is ". . .so identified in interest with another that he 
represents the same legal right.". . . In the present case, [the 
children's] mother was entrusted with their care and custody 
and was a proper representative of their interests. . . . For this 
reason, we conclude that [the children] are bound by the judg- 
ment in the divorce action to which their mother was a party. 
The opinion leaves unresolved the question of what standard is 
to be applied in measuring adequacy of representation. Such a 
determination was unnecessary since in this case the complaint 
contained "no specific allegations of fraud, concealment, or other 
intentionally wrongful conduct." 1 5 ~  
One of the major problems in determining whether a child 
has been adequately represented by his parent lies in the diffi- 
culty of ascertaining if collusion or improper compromise has 
infected an initial judgment or settlement, allegations notwith- 
standing. Consequently, preclusion based on adequate represen- 
tation is an acceptable judicial tool when applied in personal 
injury suits where danger of compromise is slight, but is not ac- 
ceptable in domestic relations cases where this danger is very 
great. 
C. Mandatory Joinder 
Perhaps the most viable solution to the preclusion problem 
is to obviate its necessity in parent-child cases by requiring join- 
der of all persons having a significant interest in the 1itigation.l" 
If all interested parties are required to join in the initial action, 
the court may determine the rights of all without the necessity 
of resorting to possibly inappropriate preclusion. Parties failing 
to intervene may be precluded from further litigation by such a 
mandatory intervention rule.1s0 
Mandatory joinder of parties has been required at common 
law,la in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,162 and in the proce- 
dural rules of many states.'" Joinder of parties with related 
-- 
158. 15 Cal. 3d at 948, 544 P.2d at 946, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 810. 
159. For general discussion of compulsory joinder, see Reed, Compulsory Joinder of 
Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MICH. L. REV. 327 & 483 (1957). See also McCoid, supra note 
153, at 724-28. 
160. See McCoid, supra note 153, at 718-24; Comment, Nonparties and Preclusion 
by Judgment: The Privity Rule Reconsidered, 56 CACIF. L. REV. 1098, 1122-32 (1968). 
161. C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 348 (2d ed. 1947). 
162. FED. R. CIV. P. 19. 
163. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110,# 23 (Smith-Hurd 1968); TEx. R. CIV. P.  39. Several 
states have specialized compulsory joinder statutes pertaining to certain subject matter. 
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claims is mandated by three policies: (1) to prevent a multiplicity 
of suits on a single cause of action, (2) to eliminate the possibility 
of multiple recoveries on a single claim, and (3) to rank claims 
in order to facilitate pro rata distribution of any assets obtained 
in the judgment? The first two reasons indicate that preclusion 
and compulsory joinder share common policy bases. Thus, pre- 
clusion by its nature serves as an encouragement to joinder of 
Two principal problems inherent in typical mandatory join- 
der provisions are not generally found in cases where parent and 
child have related interests that mandate joinder. First, the pro- 
vision for nonjoinder if personal or subject matter jurisdiction 
would be destroyedlu is unlikely to apply to a case involving the 
joinder of a minor child with his parent. Second, the provision 
requiring a plaintiff to list all joinable parties,lW which often pre- 
sents problems in identification of potential parties, is certainly 
not a deterrent to joinder of a child in either personal injury or 
domestic relations cases. 
Joinder is a particularly suitable remedy in divorce and filia- 
tion cases because parent and child often have diverse interests 
that require separate representation to insure protection of rights 
and to prevent spurious litigation. The Uniform Parentage ActlBS 
presents a major step toward fulfilling the purposes of preclusion 
without creating the possibility of abridging the rights of the 
minor child in a paternity suit. The Act requires a child whose 
parentage is in question to be joined in the filiation proceeding. 
Prior to promulgation and adoption of the Act, few states made 
it a practice either to join the child as a party to divorce or 
filiation proceedings in which paternity was contestedlBg or to 
appoint a guardian ad litem. The Act provides in part: 
E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Civ. R. 19, 19.1 (Page 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1625 
(Purdon 1953). 
164. Blume, Required Joinder of Claims, 45 MICH. L. REV. 797, 804-06 (1947). 
165. Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality, and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1457, 1471-73 (1968). 
166. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a). 
167. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 39(c): "(c) Pleading Reasons for Nonjoinder. A pleading 
asserting a claim for relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons 
[needed for just adjudication]. . .who are not joined, and the reasons why they are not 
joined." 
168. The Uniform Parentage Act has been adopted in California, Hawaii, Montana, 
North Dakota, and Washington. See 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 358 (Supp. 1977). 
169. See Ohms v. Ohms, 285 App. Div. 839,137 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1955); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 891.39 (West 1966). 
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The child shall be made a party to the action. If he is a 
minor he shall be represented by his general guardian or a 
guardian ad litem appointed by the court. The child's mother 
or father may not represent the child as guardian or otherwise. 
The court may appoint the [appropriate state agency] as 
guardian ad litem for the child. . . .170 
While the Act provides that the original suit may be instigated 
by virtually any interested party,"' problems regarding who is to 
bring the action and who is the real party in interest no longer 
affect the child since he is joined as a party and is separately 
represented. Additional expense of joinder resulting from court 
appointed guardians and their counsel may be minimized by 
working through an existing state agency as the Act suggests. 
Moreover, additional expenses incurred in a proceeding con- 
ducted under the Act would most likely be offset by recovering 
child support from the fathers of children who might otherwise 
be receiving state aid. 
Adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act in Calif~rnial?~ moots 
the precendential value of the Everett decision discussed above.173 
The problems of collusive judgment, real party in interest, and 
preclusion that pervaded that case cannot exist under the new 
law. Joinder provisions similar to those in the Uniform Parentage 
Act may be extended to other areas, by legislative action, but 
unfortunately, such legislation is slow in ~ 0 m i n g . l ~ ~  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The policies underlying the preclusion doctrine are judicially 
and socially sound. As the complexities and interdependence of 
modern life create more multiple party litigation, it is incumbent 
upon the courts to develop the preclusion principles to the great- 
est extent compatible with just results. The parent-child relation- 
ship is an appropriate area for expanded application of preclu- 
sion. It is one of the few relationships susceptible to absolute 
delineation that is not within the traditional privity rubric. It is 
consequently within easy judicial control and scrutiny. 
In dealing with personal injury cases involving parent and 
170. UNIFORM PARENTAGE Am 4 9. 
171. See id. 4 6. 
172. See CAI,. CIV. CODE $ 4  7001-7018 (West Supp. 1976). 
173. Had the child been joined and represented by a court-appointed guardian, no 
compromise could have occurred. As a party, the child would also be bound by the 
judgment reached. See text accompanying notes 124-30 supra. 
174. UNIFORM PARENTAGE Am 4 9; see note 163 supra. 
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child, courts have available several alternatives to aid in imple- 
menting the preclusion policies. First, enforcement of existing 
joinder provisions can often eliminate the need for preclusion 
altogether. Second, utilization of derivative rights rules may cur- 
tail multiple litigation of single claims. Finally, application of 
preclusion based on adequate representation can be applied to 
parent-child cases without significant danger of diluting the 
child's rights. 
The chief barrier to application of preclusion to domestic 
relations cases is the desire to insulate the rights of minor chil- 
dren from parents who may compromise or inadequately repre- 
sent their interests. This problem may also be remedied within 
the ambit of current procedural law. The ideal solution is manda- 
tory joinder of children with interest in parental litigation. The 
Uniform Parentage Act offers the most nearly complete remedy 
to preclusion and privity problems in filiation suits.175 Its adop- 
tion is desirable not only to remedy these procedural problems, 
but to replace the inadequate and antiquated filiation statutes 
currently in force in most states. Lacking this specialized statute, 
courts may invoke existing joinder provisions to compel joinder 
of children in divorce or filiation proceedings where their rights 
might be litigated. 
The liberal application of privity-preclusion rules to the 
parent-child relationship suggested by the California Supreme 
Court17( is still an acceptable solution in many cases. While this 
solution is not adequate to prevent infringement of rights in all 
cases, until joinder becomes a universal practice many cases will 
continue to arise in which preclusion is the only device with which 
a court may limit spurious, repetitive litigation. 
175. Besides offering a procedural device to rectify possible preclusion problems in 
filiation suits, the Uniform Parentage Act provides an integrated system whereby illegiti- 
mate children may secure other important procedural and substantive rights. Krause, 
supra note 110. 
176. See Armstrong v. Armstrong, 15 Cal. 3d 942, 544 P.2d 941, 126 Cal. Rptr. 805; 
notes 159-63 and accompanying text supra. 
